Centre for Science Communication, University of Otago, P.O. Box 56, Dunedin, 9054, New Zealand.
Sci Eng Ethics. 2018 Oct;24(5):1393-1408. doi: 10.1007/s11948-017-9977-0. Epub 2017 Sep 22.
Science communication, as a field and as a practice, is fundamentally about knowledge distribution; it is about the access to, and the sharing of knowledge. All distribution (science communication included) brings with it issues of ethics and justice. Indeed, whether science communicators acknowledge it or not, they get to decide both which knowledge is shared (by choosing which topic is communicated), and who gets access to this knowledge (by choosing which audience it is presented to). As a result, the decisions of science communicators have important implications for epistemic justice: how knowledge is distributed fairly and equitably. This paper presents an overview of issues related to epistemic justice for science communication, and argues that there are two quite distinct ways in which science communicators can be just (or unjust) in the way they distribute knowledge. Both of these paths will be considered before concluding that, at least on one of these accounts, science communication as a field and as a practice is fundamentally epistemically unjust. Possible ways to redress this injustice are suggested.
科学传播作为一个领域和实践，从根本上说是关于知识传播的；它是关于知识的获取和分享。所有的传播（包括科学传播）都带来了伦理和正义问题。事实上，无论科学传播者是否承认，他们都可以决定分享哪些知识（通过选择要传播的主题），以及谁可以获得这些知识（通过选择将其呈现给哪些受众）。因此，科学传播者的决策对知识公正有重要影响：知识如何公平、公正地分配。本文概述了与科学传播的知识公正相关的问题，并认为科学传播者在分配知识时可以有两种截然不同的公正（或不公正）方式。在得出结论之前，将考虑这两种途径，即科学传播作为一个领域和实践，从根本上说是认识论上不公正的。本文提出了纠正这种不公正的可能途径。
