Joint Decision-Making and the Coordination of a Sustainable Supply Chain in the Context of Carbon Tax Regulation and Fairness Concerns.

Carbon tax regulation and consumers' low-carbon preference act as incentives for firms to abate emissions. Manufacturers can improve product sustainability and retailers can strengthen the promotion of low-carbon products as part of such abatement. Current incomplete rationality also affects product sustainability and low-carbon promotion level. In this context, we consider a supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer and investigate the impacts of the manufacturer's and the retailer's fairness concerns on their production sustainability level, low-carbon promotion level and profitability. We also explore the coordination contract. The results show that the manufacturer's and the retailer's fairness concerns decrease their product sustainability and low-carbon promotion level, together with the profits of the system and the manufacturer. With regard to the retailer's fairness concern, the product sustainability level and the manufacturer's profit are lower; moreover, the low-carbon promotion level and the profits of the supply chain and the retailer are higher. A revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain perfectly; however, members' fairness concerns increase the difficulty of coordination. Finally, the numerical results reveal that carbon tax regulation can encourage the manufacturer to enhance the product sustainability level. Further, the impacts on the low-carbon promotion level and firms' profitability are related to the cost coefficients of product sustainability.