Shao Qianqian, Punt Maarten, Wesseler Justus
School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, China.
Windesheim Honours College, Windesheim University of Applied Sciences, Zwolle, Netherlands.
Front Plant Sci. 2018 Sep 19;9:1324. doi: 10.3389/fpls.2018.01324. eCollection 2018.
Different countries have different regulations for the approval and cultivation of crops developed by using new plant breeding technologies (NPBTs) such as gene editing. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between global food security and the level of NPBT regulation assuming a World Nation Official (WNO) proposes advice on global NPBT food policies. We show that a stricter NPBT food regulation reduces food security as measured by food availability, access, and utilization. We also find that political rivalry among interest groups worsens the food security status, given the NPBT food technology is more productive and the regulatory policy is influenced by lobbying. When the WNO aims to improve food security and weighs the NPBT food lobby contribution more than the non-NPBT food lobby's in the lobbying game, the total lobbying contributions will be the same for the WNO, and the NPBT food lobby will be more successful in the political process. The NPBT food lobby, however, under food security loses its advantage in the political competition, and this may result in a strict NPBT food policy. Under food security problems implementing stricter NPBT food regulations results in welfare losses. JEL Code: D04, D43, D72, P16.
不同国家对利用基因编辑等新植物育种技术（NPBTs）培育的作物的审批和种植有不同规定。在本文中，假设世界国家官员（WNO）就全球NPBT食品政策提出建议，我们研究了全球粮食安全与NPBT监管水平之间的关系。我们表明，按照粮食供应、获取和利用来衡量，更严格的NPBT食品监管会降低粮食安全。我们还发现，鉴于NPBT食品技术生产力更高且监管政策受游说影响，利益集团之间的政治竞争会使粮食安全状况恶化。当WNO旨在改善粮食安全且在游说博弈中更看重NPBT食品游说贡献而非非NPBT食品游说贡献时，对WNO而言，总游说贡献将相同，且NPBT食品游说在政治进程中会更成功。然而，在粮食安全情况下，NPBT食品游说在政治竞争中失去优势，这可能导致出台严格的NPBT食品政策。在存在粮食安全问题的情况下，实施更严格的NPBT食品监管会导致福利损失。JEL代码：D04、D43、D72、P16。
