a National Institutes of Health.
b Birkbeck College, University of London.
Am J Bioeth. 2019 Sep;19(9):21-31. doi: 10.1080/15265161.2019.1630497.
The idea that payment for research participation can be coercive appears widespread among research ethics committee members, researchers, and regulatory bodies. Yet analysis of the concept of coercion by philosophers and bioethicists has mostly concluded that payment does not coerce, because coercion necessarily involves threats, not offers. In this article we aim to resolve this disagreement by distinguishing between two distinct but overlapping concepts of coercion. Consent-undermining coercion marks out certain actions as impermissible and certain agreements as unenforceable. By contrast, coercion as subjection indicates a way in which someone's interests can be partially set back in virtue of being subject to another's foreign will. While offers of payment do not normally constitute consent-undermining coercion, they do sometimes constitute coercion as subjection. We offer an analysis of coercion as subjection and propose three possible practical responses to worries about the coerciveness of payment.
研究伦理委员会成员、研究人员和监管机构普遍认为，参与研究的报酬可能具有强制性。然而，哲学家和生物伦理学家对强制概念的分析大多得出结论认为，报酬不会强制，因为强制必然涉及威胁，而不是提供。在本文中，我们旨在通过区分两个不同但重叠的强制概念来解决这一分歧。破坏同意的强制将某些行为标记为不可接受，将某些协议标记为不可执行。相比之下，作为屈从的强制表明，由于受制于他人的外国意志，某人的利益可能会部分受到阻碍。虽然支付报酬的提议通常不构成破坏同意的强制，但有时也构成屈从的强制。我们对屈从的强制进行了分析，并提出了三种可能的应对支付强制性担忧的实际方法。
