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论DNA特征、其在转基因生物假冒方面的两用潜力以及基于网络的安全解决方案。

On DNA Signatures, Their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-Based Security Solution.

作者信息

Mueller Siguna

机构信息

Independent Researcher, Kaernten, Austria.

出版信息

Front Bioeng Biotechnol. 2019 Aug 7;7:189. doi: 10.3389/fbioe.2019.00189. eCollection 2019.

Abstract

This study investigates the role and functionality of special nucleotide sequences ("DNA signatures") to detect the presence of an organism and to distinguish it from all others. After highlighting vulnerabilities of the prevalent DNA signature paradigm for the identification of agricultural genetically modified (GM) organisms it will be argued that these so-called signatures really are no signatures at all - when compared to the notion of traditional (handwritten) signatures and their generalizations in the modern (digital) world. It is suggested that a recent contamination event of an unauthorized GM strain (Paracchini et al., 2017) in Europe could have been-or the same way could be - the consequence of exploiting gaps of prevailing DNA signatures. Moreover, a recent study (Mueller, 2019) proposes that such DNA signatures may intentionally be exploited to support the counterfeiting or even weaponization of GM organisms (GMOs). These concerns mandate a re-conceptualization of how DNA signatures need to be realized. After identifying central issues of the new vulnerabilities and overlying them with practical challenges that bio-cyber hackers would be facing, recommendations are made how DNA signatures may be enhanced. To overcome the core problem of signature transferability in bioengineered mediums, it is necessary that the identifier needs to remain secret during the entire verification process. On the other hand, however, the goal of DNA signatures is to enable public verifiability, leading to a paradoxical dilemma. It is shown that this can be addressed with ideas that underlie special cryptographic signatures, in particular those of "zero-knowledge" and "invisibility." This means more than mere signature hiding, but relies on a knowledge-based proof and differentiation of a secret (here, as assigned to specific clones) which can be realized without explicit demonstration of that secret. A re-conceptualization of these principles can be used in form of a combined (digital and physical) method to establish confidentiality and prevent un-impersonation of the manufacturer. As a result, this helps mitigate the circulation of possibly hazardous GMO counterfeits and also addresses the situation whereby attackers try to blame producers for deliberately implanting illicit adulterations hidden within authorized GMOs.

摘要

本研究调查了特殊核苷酸序列(“DNA签名”)在检测生物体存在并将其与其他所有生物体区分开来方面的作用和功能。在强调了用于识别农业转基因生物的普遍DNA签名范式的漏洞之后,我们将论证,与传统(手写)签名及其在现代(数字)世界中的推广概念相比,这些所谓的签名根本算不上签名。有人认为,欧洲最近发生的一起未经授权的转基因菌株污染事件(帕拉基尼等人,2017年)可能已经是——或者同样可能是——利用现行DNA签名漏洞的结果。此外,最近的一项研究(米勒,2019年)提出,此类DNA签名可能会被故意利用,以支持转基因生物的伪造甚至武器化。这些担忧促使我们重新思考DNA签名应如何实现。在确定了新漏洞的核心问题,并叠加生物网络黑客将面临的实际挑战之后,我们提出了增强DNA签名的建议。为了克服生物工程介质中签名可转移性的核心问题,标识符在整个验证过程中必须保密。然而,另一方面,DNA签名的目标是实现公众可验证性,这就导致了一个自相矛盾的困境。研究表明,可以用特殊加密签名所依据的理念来解决这一问题,特别是“零知识”和“不可见性”签名。这不仅仅意味着隐藏签名,而是依赖于基于知识的证明以及对秘密(在此处,分配给特定克隆)的区分,这种区分可以在不明确展示该秘密的情况下实现。对这些原则进行重新概念化后,可以采用一种组合(数字和物理)方法来建立保密性,并防止假冒制造商。因此,这有助于减少可能有害的转基因生物仿冒品的流通,也解决了攻击者试图指责生产商故意在授权转基因生物中植入隐藏的非法掺假物的情况。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/14c5/6693310/19fd2919f8b1/fbioe-07-00189-g0001.jpg

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