Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Member of the Leibniz Association, Potsdam, Germany.
Technical University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany.
Nature. 2020 Dec;588(7837):261-266. doi: 10.1038/s41586-020-2982-5. Epub 2020 Dec 9.
The Paris Agreement calls for a cooperative response with the aim of limiting global warming to well below two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels while reaffirming the principles of equity and common, but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities. Although the goal is clear, the approach required to achieve it is not. Cap-and-trade policies using uniform carbon prices could produce cost-effective reductions of global carbon emissions, but tend to impose relatively high mitigation costs on developing and emerging economies. Huge international financial transfers are required to complement cap-and-trade to achieve equal sharing of effort, defined as an equal distribution of mitigation costs as a share of income, and therefore the cap-and-trade policy is often perceived as infringing on national sovereignty. Here we show that a strategy of international financial transfers guided by moderate deviations from uniform carbon pricing could achieve the goal without straining either the economies or sovereignty of nations. We use the integrated assessment model REMIND-MAgPIE to analyse alternative policies: financial transfers in uniform carbon pricing systems, differentiated carbon pricing in the absence of financial transfers, or a hybrid combining financial transfers and differentiated carbon prices. Under uniform carbon prices, a present value of international financial transfers of 4.4 trillion US dollars over the next 80 years to 2100 would be required to equalize effort. By contrast, achieving equal effort without financial transfers requires carbon prices in advanced countries to exceed those in developing countries by a factor of more than 100, leading to efficiency losses of 2.6 trillion US dollars. Hybrid solutions reveal a strongly nonlinear trade-off between cost efficiency and sovereignty: moderate deviations from uniform carbon prices strongly reduce financial transfers at relatively small efficiency losses and moderate financial transfers substantially reduce inefficiencies by narrowing the carbon price spread. We also identify risks and adverse consequences of carbon price differentiation due to market distortions that can undermine environmental sustainability targets. Quantifying the advantages and risks of carbon price differentiation provides insight into climate and sector-specific policy mixes.
《巴黎协定》呼吁采取合作应对措施,目标是将全球变暖幅度控制在工业化前水平以上 2 摄氏度以内,同时重申公平和共同但有区别的责任和能力原则。尽管目标明确,但实现目标的方法并不明确。使用统一碳价格的总量管制与排放交易政策可以实现全球碳排放的成本效益减排,但往往会给发展中国家和新兴经济体带来相对较高的减排成本。需要巨额国际资金转移来补充总量管制与排放交易,以实现公平分担努力,即按照收入份额平等分配减排成本,因此总量管制与排放交易政策往往被视为侵犯国家主权。在这里,我们表明,在适度偏离统一碳定价的国际资金转移策略下,可以在不影响各国经济或主权的情况下实现这一目标。我们使用综合评估模型 REMIND-MAgPIE 来分析替代政策:统一碳定价系统中的资金转移、没有资金转移的差异化碳定价,或结合资金转移和差异化碳价格的混合政策。在统一碳价格下,到 2100 年的未来 80 年内,需要进行 4.4 万亿美元的国际资金转移,以实现公平分担努力。相比之下,在没有资金转移的情况下实现公平分担努力,则需要发达国家的碳价超过发展中国家的碳价 100 多倍,导致 2.6 万亿美元的效率损失。混合解决方案揭示了成本效率和主权之间的强烈非线性权衡关系:适度偏离统一碳价格会大大减少资金转移,同时效率损失相对较小,适度的资金转移会通过缩小碳价差距大大减少效率损失。我们还确定了由于市场扭曲导致的碳价差异化的风险和不利后果,这可能会破坏环境可持续性目标。量化碳价差异化的优势和风险为气候和部门特定的政策组合提供了深入了解。