Department of Communicable Diseases Control, National Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology, Hanoi, Viet Nam; National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, Research School of Population Health, College of Health and Medicine, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
Department of Communicable Diseases Control, National Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology, Hanoi, Viet Nam.
Travel Med Infect Dis. 2021 Jul-Aug;42:102084. doi: 10.1016/j.tmaid.2021.102084. Epub 2021 May 26.
The importation of SARS-CoV-2 through air travel poses substantial risks to generate new COVID-19 outbreaks. Timely contact tracing is particularly crucial to limit onwards transmission in settings without established community transmission.
We conducted an in-depth analysis of the response to a big flight-associated COVID-19 outbreak in Vietnam in March 2020 that involved contact tracing, systematic testing and strict quarantine up to third generation contacts.
183 primary contacts from the flight as well as 1000 secondary and 311 third generation contacts were traced, tested, and quarantined across 15 provinces across Vietnam. The protracted confirmation of the index case at 3 days and 19 h after arrival resulted in isolation/quarantine delays of 6.8 days (IQR 6.3-6.8) and 5.8 days (IQR 5.8-7.0) for primary and secondary cases, respectively, which generated 84.0 and 26.4 person-days of community exposure from primary and secondary cases, respectively. Nevertheless, only 5 secondary cases occurred.
A large flight-related COVID-19 cluster was successfully contained through timely, systematic and comprehensive public health responses despite delayed index case identification. Multiagency collaboration and pre-established mechanisms are crucial for low and middle income countries like Vietnam to limit community transmission after COVID-19 importation through air travel.
通过航空旅行输入 SARS-CoV-2 会带来产生新的 COVID-19 爆发的巨大风险。及时的接触者追踪对于在没有社区传播的情况下限制传播至关重要。
我们对 2020 年 3 月越南发生的一次与大型航班相关的 COVID-19 爆发进行了深入分析,该爆发涉及接触者追踪、系统检测和严格的隔离直至第三代接触者。
从航班上追踪到 183 名一级接触者,以及 1000 名二级和 311 名三级接触者,并在越南 15 个省份进行了检测和隔离。由于对索引病例的确认时间延迟了 3 天 19 小时,导致一级和二级病例的隔离/检疫时间分别延迟了 6.8 天(IQR 6.3-6.8)和 5.8 天(IQR 5.8-7.0),分别导致一级和二级病例产生了 84.0 和 26.4 人日的社区暴露。尽管如此,仅发生了 5 例二级病例。
尽管延迟了对索引病例的识别,但通过及时、系统和全面的公共卫生应对措施,成功遏制了与大型航班相关的 COVID-19 集群。多机构合作和预先建立的机制对于越南等中低收入国家在 COVID-19 通过航空旅行输入后限制社区传播至关重要。