Buckenmaier Johannes, Dimant Eugen, Posten Ann-Christin, Schmidt Ulrich
University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA USA.
J Risk Uncertain. 2021;62(2):177-201. doi: 10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x. Epub 2021 Jul 23.
Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of and of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly overlooked: the of formal sanctions. We consider two dimensions: the timing at which the uncertainty about whether one will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combination thereof. By varying these dimensions of delay systematically, we find a surprising non-monotonic relation with deterrence: either no delay (immediate resolution and immediate punishment) or maximum delay (both resolution and punishment as much as possible delayed) emerge as most effective at deterring deviant behavior and recidivism. Our results yield implications for the design of institutional policies aimed at mitigating misconduct and reducing recidivism.
The online version contains supplementary material available at doi:10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x.
经济理论表明，对越轨行为的威慑是由惩罚的确定性和严厉程度共同驱动的。本文首次进行了一项对照实验，以研究一个主要被忽视的第三个重要因素：正式制裁的时机。我们考虑两个维度：一个人是否会受到惩罚的不确定性消除的时间以及实际实施惩罚的时间，以及它们的组合。通过系统地改变这些延迟维度，我们发现了与威慑力惊人的非单调关系：要么没有延迟（立即解决和立即惩罚），要么最大延迟（解决和惩罚都尽可能延迟）在威慑越轨行为和累犯方面最为有效。我们的结果对旨在减轻不当行为和减少累犯的制度政策设计具有启示意义。
在线版本包含可在doi:10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x获取的补充材料。
