Center for Innovation and Development Studies, Beijing Normal University, Zhuhai, China.
Economics and Resource Management, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China.
Front Public Health. 2021 Nov 15;9:747239. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2021.747239. eCollection 2021.
The sharing and utilization of online users' information has become an important resource for governments to manage COVID-19; however, it also involves the risk of leakage of users' personal information. Online users' sharing decisions regarding personal information and the government's COVID-19 prevention and control decisions influence each other and jointly determine the efficiency of COVID-19 control and prevention. Using the evolutionary game models, this paper examines the behavioral patterns of online users and governments with regard to the sharing and disclosure of COVID-19 information for its prevention and control. This paper deduce the reasons and solutions underlying the contradiction between the privacy risks faced by online users in sharing information and COVID-19 prevention and control efforts. The inconsistency between individual and collective rationality is the root cause of the inefficiency of COVID-19 prevention and control. The reconciliation of privacy protection with COVID-19 prevention and control efficiency can be achieved by providing guidance and incentives to modulate internet users' behavioral expectations.
在线用户信息的共享和利用已成为政府管理 COVID-19 的重要资源;然而,这也涉及到用户个人信息泄露的风险。在线用户个人信息共享决策和政府 COVID-19 防控决策相互影响,共同决定 COVID-19 防控的效率。本文使用进化博弈模型,考察了在线用户和政府在 COVID-19 防控中信息共享和披露的行为模式。本文推导出了在线用户在信息共享方面面临的隐私风险与 COVID-19 防控努力之间矛盾的原因和解决方案。个体理性与集体理性之间的不一致是 COVID-19 防控效率低下的根本原因。通过为调节互联网用户的行为预期提供指导和激励,可以实现隐私保护与 COVID-19 防控效率的协调。