Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.
St John's College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.
Nat Hum Behav. 2022 Sep;6(9):1268-1279. doi: 10.1038/s41562-022-01360-4. Epub 2022 May 30.
Humans and other animals routinely make choices between goods of different values. Choices are often made within identifiable contexts, such that an efficient learner may represent values relative to their local context. However, if goods occur across multiple contexts, a relative value code can lead to irrational choices. In this case, an absolute context-independent value is preferable to a relative code. Here we test the hypothesis that value representation is not fixed but rationally adapted to context expectations. In two experiments, we manipulated participants' expectations about whether item values learned within local contexts would need to be subsequently compared across contexts. Despite identical learning experiences, the group whose expectations included choices across local contexts went on to learn more absolute-like representation than the group whose expectations covered only fixed local contexts. Human value representation is thus neither relative nor absolute but efficiently and rationally tuned to task demands.
人类和其他动物经常在不同价值的物品之间做出选择。选择通常是在可识别的情境下做出的，因此一个有效的学习者可以根据其局部情境来表示价值。然而，如果物品出现在多个情境中，相对价值代码可能会导致不合理的选择。在这种情况下，绝对的、不依赖于情境的价值优于相对的代码。在这里，我们检验了这样一个假设，即价值表示不是固定的，而是可以根据情境期望进行合理调整。在两个实验中，我们操纵了参与者关于在局部情境中学习的项目价值是否需要随后在情境间进行比较的预期。尽管有相同的学习经验，但预期包括局部情境间选择的那组人比预期仅包括固定局部情境的那组人更能学习到更类似于绝对的表示。因此，人类的价值表示既不是相对的，也不是绝对的，而是根据任务需求进行有效和合理的调整。
