Wrage Birte
Unit of Ethics and Human-Animal Studies, Messerli Research Institute, Vetmeduni Vienna, Uni Vienna, MedUni Vienna, Vienna, Austria.
Biol Philos. 2022;37(3):18. doi: 10.1007/s10539-022-09857-y. Epub 2022 May 26.
Are there nonhuman animals who behave ? In this paper I answer this question in the affirmative by applying the framework of care ethics to the animal morality debate. According to care ethics, empathic care is the wellspring of morality in humans. While there have been several suggestive analyses of nonhuman animals as empathic, much of the literature within the animal morality debate has marginalized analyses from the perspective of care ethics. In this paper I examine care ethics to extract its core commitments to what is required for moral care: emotional motivation that enables the intentional meeting of another's needs, and forward-looking responsibility in particular relationships. What is not required, I argue, are metarepresentational capacities or the ability to scrutinize one's reasons for action, and thus being retrospectively accountable. This minimal account of moral care is illustrated by moral practices of parental care seen in many nonhuman animal species. In response to the worry that parental care in nonhuman animals lacks all evaluation and is therefore nonmoral I point to cultural differences in human parenting and to normativity in nonhuman animals.
是否存在表现出某种行为的非人类动物?在本文中,我通过将关怀伦理学的框架应用于动物道德辩论,对这个问题给出肯定的回答。根据关怀伦理学,移情关怀是人类道德的源泉。虽然已经有一些关于非人类动物具有移情能力的启发性分析,但动物道德辩论中的许多文献都将来自关怀伦理学视角的分析边缘化了。在本文中,我审视关怀伦理学,以提炼出它对道德关怀所需条件的核心承诺:能够促使有意满足他人需求的情感动机,尤其是在特定关系中的前瞻性责任。我认为,道德关怀并不需要元表征能力或审视自己行动理由的能力,因此也不需要事后问责。许多非人类动物物种中所见的亲代关怀的道德实践就说明了这种对道德关怀的最低限度解释。针对非人类动物的亲代关怀缺乏所有评价因而不具有道德性这一担忧,我指出人类养育子女中的文化差异以及非人类动物中的规范性。