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重新调整坦桑尼亚公立医疗机构的激励机制以解决非正式支付问题:一项离散选择实验。

Re-aligning Incentives to Address Informal Payments in Tanzania Public Health Facilities: A Discrete Choice Experiment.

机构信息

Department of Health System, Impact Evaluation and Policy, Ifakara Health Institute, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Department of Economics, SOAS University of London, London, UK.

出版信息

Int J Health Policy Manag. 2023;12:6877. doi: 10.34172/ijhpm.2022.6877. Epub 2022 Dec 3.

Abstract

BACKGROUND

Informal payments for healthcare are typically regressive and limit access to quality healthcare while increasing risk of catastrophic health expenditure, especially in developing countries. Different responses have been proposed, but little is known about how they influence the incentives driving this behaviour. We therefore identified providers' preferences for policy interventions to overcome informal payments in Tanzania.

METHODS

We undertook a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to elicit preferences over various policy options with 432 health providers in 42 public health facilities in Pwani and Dar es Salaam region. DCE attributes were derived from a multi-stage process including a literature review, qualitative interviews with key informants, a workshop with health stakeholders, expert opinions, and a pilot test. Each respondent received 12 unlabelled choice sets describing two hypothetical job-settings that varied across 6-attributes: mode of payment, supervision at facility, opportunity for private practice, awareness and monitoring, measures against informal payments, and incentive payments to encourage noninfraction. Mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) models were used for estimation.

RESULTS

All attributes, apart from supervision at facility, significantly influenced providers' choices (<.001). Health providers strongly and significantly preferred incentive payments for non-infraction and opportunities for private practice, but significantly disliked disciplinary measures at district level. Preferences varied across the sample, although all groups significantly preferred the opportunity to practice privately and cashless payment. Disciplinary measures at district level were significantly disliked by unit in-charges, those who never engaged in informal payments, and who were not absent from work for official trip. 10% salary top-up were preferred incentive by all, except those who engaged in informal payments and absent from work for official trip.

CONCLUSION

Better working conditions, with improved earnings and career paths, were strongly preferred by all, different respondents groups had distinct preferences according to their characteristics, suggesting the need for adoption of tailored packages of interventions.

摘要

背景

医疗保健领域的非正式支付通常是倒退的,限制了人们获得高质量医疗保健的机会,同时增加了灾难性医疗支出的风险,尤其是在发展中国家。针对这种情况,已经提出了不同的应对措施,但对于这些措施如何影响推动这种行为的激励机制,人们知之甚少。因此,我们确定了坦桑尼亚医疗服务提供者对克服非正式支付的政策干预措施的偏好。

方法

我们在蓬阿和达累斯萨拉姆地区的 42 家公立医疗机构中,对 432 名卫生服务提供者进行了离散选择实验(DCE),以了解他们对各种政策选择的偏好。DCE 属性源自一个多阶段的过程,包括文献综述、与关键利益相关者的定性访谈、卫生利益相关者研讨会、专家意见和试点测试。每位受访者收到 12 个未标记的选择集,这些选择集描述了两种不同的假设工作场景,这些场景在 6 个属性上有所不同:支付方式、机构监督、私人执业机会、意识和监测、反非正式支付措施和鼓励不违规的激励性支付。使用混合多项逻辑回归(MMNL)模型进行估计。

结果

除了机构监督外,所有属性都对提供者的选择产生了显著影响(<.001)。卫生服务提供者强烈且显著地偏好非违规和私人执业机会的激励性支付,但非常不喜欢地区一级的纪律措施。尽管所有群体都显著偏好私人执业和无现金支付,但偏好因样本而异。地区一级的纪律措施受到单位负责人、从不从事非正式支付的人和因公务出差缺勤的人的强烈反对。所有群体都更喜欢 10%的工资补贴作为激励措施,除了从事非正式支付和因公务出差缺勤的人。

结论

更好的工作条件,包括更高的收入和职业发展,受到所有人的强烈偏好,不同的受访者群体根据其特点有不同的偏好,这表明需要采取有针对性的干预措施包。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/d511/10125169/ccbbafde6059/ijhpm-12-6877-g001.jpg

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