Fasina Folorunso O, Mtui-Malamsha Niwael, Nonga Hezron E, Ranga Svetlana, Sambu Rosamystica M, Majaliwa Jerome, Kamani Enos, Okuthe Sam, Kivaria Fredrick, Bebay Charles, Penrith Mary-Louise
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy.
Department of Veterinary Tropical Diseases, University of Pretoria, Onderstepoort 0110, South Africa.
Vet Med Int. 2024 May 13;2024:4929141. doi: 10.1155/2024/4929141. eCollection 2024.
African swine fever (ASF) has remained persistent in Tanzania since the early 2000s. Between 2020 and 2021, pig farms in twelve districts in Tanzania were infected with ASF, and ≥4,804 pigs reportedly died directly due to the disease with disruption to livelihoods. We conducted semiquantitative field investigations and rapid risk assessment (RRA) to understand the risk factors and drivers of ASF virus (ASFV) amplification and transmission in smallholder pig farms, and determine the gaps in biosecurity through hazard profiling, focus group discussions and expert opinion. Outbreaks were connected by road and aligned along the pig product value chain and reported in the northern, central, and southern parts of Tanzania. The patterns of outbreaks and impacts differed among districts, but cases of ASF appeared to be self-limiting following significant mortality of pigs in farms. Movement of infected pigs, movement of contaminated pig products, and fomites associated with service providers, vehicles, and equipment, as well as the inadvertent risks associated with movements of animal health practitioners, visitors, and scavengers were the riskiest pathways to introduce ASFV into smallholder pig farms. Identified drivers and facilitators of risk of ASFV infection in smallholder pig farms were traders in whole pigs, middlemen, pig farmers, transporters, unauthorized animal health service providers, and traders in pork. All identified pig groups were susceptible to ASFV, particularly shared adult boars, pregnant and lactating sows, and other adult females. The risk of ASF for smallholder pig farms in Tanzania remains very high based on a systematic risk classification. The majority of the farms had poor biosecurity and no single farm implemented all identified biosecurity measures. Risky practices and breaches of biosecurity in the pig value chain in Tanzania are profit driven and are extremely difficult to change. Behavioural change communication must target identified drivers of infections, attitudes, and practices.
自21世纪初以来，非洲猪瘟（ASF）在坦桑尼亚一直持续存在。在2020年至2021年期间，坦桑尼亚12个地区的养猪场感染了非洲猪瘟，据报道，≥4804头猪直接死于该病，民众生计受到影响。我们开展了半定量现场调查和快速风险评估（RRA），以了解ASF病毒（ASFV）在小农户养猪场扩增和传播的风险因素及驱动因素，并通过危害分析、焦点小组讨论和专家意见确定生物安全方面的差距。疫情通过道路相互关联，并沿生猪产品价值链分布，在坦桑尼亚北部、中部和南部均有报告。不同地区的疫情模式和影响有所不同，但在农场生猪大量死亡后，ASF疫情似乎具有自我局限性。感染猪的移动、受污染猪产品的移动以及与服务提供商、车辆和设备相关的污染物，以及与动物卫生从业者、访客和拾荒者移动相关的意外风险，是将ASFV引入小农户养猪场的最危险途径。在小农户养猪场中，已确定的ASFV感染风险驱动因素和促进因素包括整猪交易商、中间商、养猪户、运输商、未经授权的动物卫生服务提供商和猪肉交易商。所有已识别的猪群均易感染ASFV，尤其是共用成年公猪、怀孕和哺乳母猪以及其他成年母猪。根据系统风险分类，坦桑尼亚小农户养猪场面临的ASF风险仍然非常高。大多数农场的生物安全措施较差，没有一个农场实施了所有已识别的生物安全措施。坦桑尼亚生猪价值链中危险的做法和生物安全漏洞是由利润驱动的，极难改变。行为改变宣传必须针对已确定的感染驱动因素、态度和做法。
