Ding Xinting, Ren Jifan, Lu Haiyan, Hussain Jafar, Zhou Renzhong
School of Economics and Management, Harbin Institute of Technology Shenzhen, Guangdong, China.
School of Finance and Economics, Nanchang Institute of Technology, Jiangxi, China.
Heliyon. 2024 Oct 11;10(20):e39242. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e39242. eCollection 2024 Oct 30.
Regional collaborative governance has become a key strategy for environmental protection, especially in reducing transboundary pollution transfer. This study, set against the backdrop of environmental governance in China's Fen-Wei Plain, employs evolutionary game theory to deeply analyze the strategic choices of local governments in managing haze pollution. We developed a model incorporating 14 key variables to systematically explore the emission reduction strategies of local governments under various policy environments. Through numerical simulations, we not only validate the effectiveness of the model but also focuses on how incentives and punishments from the central government influence the stability of local governments adopting a "strict enforcement" strategy. We find that appropriate incentives from the central government can significantly enhance the tendency of local governments to choose a "strict enforcement" strategy for emission reduction. Under certain conditions, whether adopting "strict enforcement" or "superficial enforcement," both can lead to an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). Moreover, the intensity of rewards and penalties from the central government and the benefits of collaborative governance by local governments are key factors determining the stability of strategies. Our findings underscore the importance of establishing performance-oriented incentive mechanisms, refining reward and punishment measures, and focusing on sustainable and adaptable governance strategies. The strategic recommendations provided by this study offer important guidance for balancing incentives and punishments, thereby stimulating local government enthusiasm for governance, which supports high-quality environmental protection and sustainable development goals.
区域协同治理已成为环境保护的关键策略，尤其是在减少跨界污染转移方面。本研究以中国汾渭平原的环境治理为背景，运用演化博弈理论深入分析地方政府在治理雾霾污染中的战略选择。我们构建了一个包含14个关键变量的模型，系统地探讨了不同政策环境下地方政府的减排策略。通过数值模拟，我们不仅验证了模型的有效性，还重点研究了中央政府的奖惩措施如何影响地方政府采取“严格执法”策略的稳定性。我们发现，中央政府适当的激励措施可以显著增强地方政府选择“严格执法”减排策略的倾向。在一定条件下，无论是采取“严格执法”还是“表面执法”，都能导致演化稳定策略（ESS）。此外，中央政府奖惩的强度以及地方政府协同治理的收益是决定策略稳定性的关键因素。我们的研究结果强调了建立以绩效为导向的激励机制、完善奖惩措施以及注重可持续和适应性治理策略的重要性。本研究提出的战略建议为平衡奖惩提供了重要指导，从而激发地方政府的治理积极性，支持高质量环境保护和可持续发展目标。
