An evolutionary game study of traffic safety risk regulation considering public participation behavior.

With the development of transportation technology, the improvement of transportation efficiency also increases the complexity and diversity of traffic safety risks; the public's concern for traffic safety risks is increasing, and the traditional regulatory model is difficult to meet the improvement of the effectiveness of the safety regulation of the huge transportation network and the public's changing safety needs. In order to enhance the effectiveness of safety regulation, a game model of safety risk regulation among the public, transport enterprises, and regulators is constructed to simulate the effects of different traffic risks, penalty levels, and exposure rates on the behavior of transport enterprises and regulators. The results of the study show that: traffic risk has a positive facilitating effect on the participation of transport enterprises and the public in the regulation of safety risks, which will accelerate the process of stabilization of their strategies; transport enterprises have a high sensitivity to changes in the level of punishment, and only when the level of punishment exceeds a certain threshold will they be able to promote the choice of complying with the transport; and a higher exposure will lead to a greater tendency for transport enterprises to choose complying with the transport.