Liu Zheng, Huang Na, Hu Bin, Zhao Yuanjun, Kown Il Sook
School of Management, Shanghai University of Engineering Science, Shanghai, 201620, China.
School of Accounting, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing, 211815, China.
Sci Rep. 2024 Dec 3;14(1):30069. doi: 10.1038/s41598-024-81374-2.
With the development of transportation technology, the improvement of transportation efficiency also increases the complexity and diversity of traffic safety risks; the public's concern for traffic safety risks is increasing, and the traditional regulatory model is difficult to meet the improvement of the effectiveness of the safety regulation of the huge transportation network and the public's changing safety needs. In order to enhance the effectiveness of safety regulation, a game model of safety risk regulation among the public, transport enterprises, and regulators is constructed to simulate the effects of different traffic risks, penalty levels, and exposure rates on the behavior of transport enterprises and regulators. The results of the study show that: traffic risk has a positive facilitating effect on the participation of transport enterprises and the public in the regulation of safety risks, which will accelerate the process of stabilization of their strategies; transport enterprises have a high sensitivity to changes in the level of punishment, and only when the level of punishment exceeds a certain threshold will they be able to promote the choice of complying with the transport; and a higher exposure will lead to a greater tendency for transport enterprises to choose complying with the transport.
随着交通技术的发展，运输效率的提高也增加了交通安全风险的复杂性和多样性；公众对交通安全风险的关注度不断提高，传统监管模式难以满足庞大交通网络安全监管有效性的提升以及公众不断变化的安全需求。为提高安全监管的有效性，构建了公众、运输企业和监管者之间的安全风险监管博弈模型，以模拟不同交通风险、处罚水平和曝光率对运输企业及监管者行为的影响。研究结果表明：交通风险对运输企业和公众参与安全风险监管具有正向促进作用，这将加速其策略的稳定进程；运输企业对处罚水平的变化具有较高敏感性，只有当处罚水平超过一定阈值时，才会促使其选择合规运输；较高的曝光度会使运输企业更倾向于选择合规运输。
