Depressive realism from the perspective of cognitive-experiential self-theory.

To explain why the depressive realism effect has been found in trivial, artificial laboratory but not in more realistic or emotionally engaging situations, the authors hypothesized that depressed people overcompensate for a tendency toward maladaptive experiential (intuitive) processing by exercising excessive rational control in trivial situations. In more consequential situations, they are unable to control their maladaptive experiential processing because it is excessive, or their rational control is insufficient, or both. As predicted, a subclinically depressed group (n = 39) made more optimal decisions than a nondepressed control group (n = 36) under trivial conditions, and the groups converged under more consequential conditions, with the depressed group responding less and the control group more optimally. Also, the depressed group reported engaging in less rational processing and in more maladaptive experiential processing in everyday life than did the control group.