Rick Scott, Loewenstein George
Department of Operations and Information Management, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA.
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2008 Dec 12;363(1511):3813-24. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2008.0150.
Since the advent of the discounted utility (DU) model, economists have thought about intertemporal choice in very specific terms. DU assumes that people make explicit trade-offs between costs and benefits occurring at different points in time. While this explicit trade-off perspective is simple and tractable, and has stimulated productive research, it does not provide a very realistic representation of a wide range of the most important intertemporal trade-offs that people face in daily life. If one considers the most important and commonly discussed examples of intertemporal choices, a striking pattern emerges: in almost all cases, early outcomes tend to be concrete (e.g. purchasing this latte), but later outcomes tend to be much less tangible (e.g. the unknown item that could have been purchased later with the money spent on this latte). We propose that people rely on anticipatory emotions as a proxy for intangible outcomes when trade-offs are implicit. This paper reviews neuroeconomic evidence that has begun to elucidate the role of anticipatory emotions in decisions involving intangible outcomes. Although most progress has been made in the domain of spending and saving, we discuss how the existing neuroeconomic research could be extended to other domains where trade-offs are ill defined.
自从贴现效用(DU)模型出现以来,经济学家们一直从非常具体的角度思考跨期选择。DU模型假设人们会在不同时间点发生的成本和收益之间进行明确的权衡。虽然这种明确权衡的观点简单且易于处理,并激发了富有成效的研究,但它并不能非常真实地反映人们在日常生活中面临的广泛且最重要的跨期权衡。如果考虑跨期选择中最重要且常被讨论的例子,就会出现一个显著的模式:几乎在所有情况下,早期结果往往是具体的(例如购买这杯拿铁咖啡),但后期结果往往不太具体(例如用花在这杯拿铁咖啡上的钱本可以在以后购买的未知物品)。我们认为,当权衡是隐含的时候,人们会依赖预期情绪来替代无形的结果。本文回顾了神经经济学证据,这些证据已开始阐明预期情绪在涉及无形结果的决策中的作用。尽管在消费和储蓄领域取得了最大进展,但我们讨论了现有的神经经济学研究如何能够扩展到权衡定义不明确的其他领域。