Goette Lorenz, Stutzer Alois, Frey Beat M
Département of Economics, University of Lausanne, Switzerland.
Transfus Med Hemother. 2010 Jun;37(3):149-154. doi: 10.1159/000314737. Epub 2010 May 25.
Recent shortages in the supply of blood donations have renewed the interest in how blood donations can be increased temporarily. We survey the evidence on the role of financial and other incentives in eliciting blood donations among donors who are normally willing to donate pro bono. We present the predictions from different empirical/psychological-based theories, with some predicting that incentives are effective while others predict that incentives may undermine prosocial motivation. The evidence suggests that incentives work relatively well in settings in which donors are relatively anonymous, but evidence indicates also that when image concerns become important, incentives may be counterproductive as donors do not want to be seen as greedy.
近期献血供应短缺再次引发了人们对于如何临时增加献血量的关注。我们调查了关于经济激励及其他激励措施在促使通常愿意无偿献血的人群献血方面所起作用的证据。我们展示了基于不同实证/心理学理论的预测结果，其中一些预测激励措施是有效的，而另一些则预测激励措施可能会削弱亲社会动机。证据表明，在献血者相对匿名的情况下，激励措施效果相对较好，但也有证据表明，当形象问题变得重要时，激励措施可能会适得其反，因为献血者不想被视为贪婪之人。
