Selgelid Michael J
Centre for Human Bioethics; School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies; Monash University, Clayton, VIC, 3800, Australia,
Med Health Care Philos. 2014 Feb;17(1):3-12. doi: 10.1007/s11019-013-9485-1.
Though the reputation of eugenics has been tarnished by history, eugenics per se is not necessarily a bad thing. Many advocate a liberal new eugenics--where individuals are free to choose whether or not to employ genetic technologies for reproductive purposes. Though genetic interventions aimed at the prevention of severe genetic disorders may be morally and socially acceptable, reproductive liberty in the context of enhancement may conflict with equality. Enhancement could also have adverse effects on utility. The enhancement debate requires a shift in focus. What the equality and/or utility costs of enhancement will be is an empirical question. Rather than philosophical speculation, more social science research is needed to address it. Philosophers, meanwhile, should address head-on the question of how to strike a balance between liberty, equality, and utility in cases of conflict (in the context of genetics).
尽管优生学的声誉已被历史玷污,但优生学本身不一定是坏事。许多人倡导一种自由的新优生学——即个人可以自由选择是否将基因技术用于生殖目的。尽管旨在预防严重遗传疾病的基因干预在道德和社会层面可能是可接受的,但在增强能力的背景下,生殖自由可能与平等相冲突。增强能力也可能对效用产生不利影响。关于增强能力的辩论需要转变焦点。增强能力的平等和/或效用成本将会是多少,这是一个实证问题。需要更多的社会科学研究来解决这个问题,而不是进行哲学思辨。与此同时,哲学家们应该直面在冲突情况下(在遗传学背景下)如何在自由、平等和效用之间取得平衡的问题。