World Health Organization Country Office, P. O. Box 3069, Addis Abba, Ethiopia.
Inter-Country Support Team eastern and Southern Africa, IST, Harare, Zimbabwe.
BMC Infect Dis. 2018 Jan 5;18(1):9. doi: 10.1186/s12879-017-2904-9.
Ethiopia joined the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) in 1996, and by the end of December 2001 circulation of indigenous Wild Polio Virus (WPV) had been interrupted. Nonetheless, the country experienced multiple importations during 2004-2008, and in 2013. We characterize the 2013 outbreak investigations and response activities, and document lessons learned.
The data were pulled from different field investigation reports and from the national surveillance database for Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP).
In 2013, a WPV1 outbreak was confirmed following importation in Dollo zone of the Somali region, which affected three Woredas (Warder, Geladi and Bokh). Between July 10, 2013, and January 5, 2014, there were 10 children paralyzed due to WPV1 infection. The majorities (7 of 10) were male and below 5 years of age, and 7 of 10 cases was not vaccinated, and 72% (92/129) of < 5 years of old children living in close proximity with WPV cases had zero doses of oral polio vaccine (OPV). The travel history of the cases showed that seven of the 10 cases had contact with someone who had traveled or had a travel history prior to the onset of paralysis. Underserved and inaccessibility of routine immunization service, suboptimal surveillance sensitivity, poor quality and inadequate supplemental immunization were the most crucial gaps identified during the outbreak investigations.
Prior to the 2013 outbreak, Ethiopia experienced multiple imported polio outbreaks following the interruption of indigenous WPV in December 2001. The 2013 outbreak erupted due to massive population movement and was fueled by low population immunity as a result of low routine immunization and supplemental Immunization coverage and quality. In order to avert future outbreaks, it is critical that surveillance sensitivity be improved by establishing community-based surveillance systems and by assigning surveillance focal points at all level particularly in border areas. In addition, it is vital to set up in hard to reach areas a functional immunization service delivery system using the "Reaching Every Child" approach, including periodic routine immunization intensification and supplemental immunization activities.
埃塞俄比亚于 1996 年加入全球根除脊髓灰质炎行动(GPEI),截至 2001 年 12 月底,本土野生脊髓灰质炎病毒(WPV)的传播已被阻断。然而,该国在 2004 年至 2008 年以及 2013 年均经历了多次输入性病例,我们对 2013 年暴发的调查和应对活动进行了描述,并记录了经验教训。
数据取自不同的现场调查报告和国家急性弛缓性麻痹(AFP)监测数据库。
2013 年,索马里地区多洛区发生 WPV1 输入性暴发,影响了沃雷达、盖拉迪和博赫三个区。2013 年 7 月 10 日至 2014 年 1 月 5 日,有 10 名儿童因 WPV1 感染而瘫痪。大多数(10 例中的 7 例)为男性,年龄均在 5 岁以下,且 7 例未接种疫苗,72%(92/129)居住在 WPV 病例附近的<5 岁儿童完全未接种口服脊髓灰质炎疫苗(OPV)。病例的旅行史显示,10 例中有 7 例与发病前曾旅行或有旅行史的人有过接触。在暴发调查中发现的最关键的差距包括服务提供不足和无法获得常规免疫服务、监测敏感性欠佳、免疫质量差和补充免疫不足。
在 2001 年 12 月本土 WPV 传播被阻断后,埃塞俄比亚在 2013 年之前经历了多次输入性脊灰暴发。2013 年的暴发是由于大规模人口流动造成的,由于常规免疫和补充免疫覆盖率和质量低,导致人群免疫力低下,从而助长了疫情。为了避免未来的暴发,必须通过建立以社区为基础的监测系统和在各级,特别是在边境地区指定监测协调人,提高监测敏感性。此外,必须使用“关爱每个儿童”的方法,在难以到达的地区建立一个功能齐全的免疫服务提供系统,包括定期强化常规免疫和补充免疫活动。