Timmons Shane, Byrne Ruth Mj
School of Psychology and Institute of Neuroscience, Trinity College Dublin, University of Dublin, Dublin, Ireland.
Q J Exp Psychol (Hove). 2019 Apr;72(4):943-954. doi: 10.1177/1747021818772045. Epub 2018 May 7.
We report two experiments that show a moral fatigue effect: participants who are fatigued after they have carried out a tiring cognitive task make different moral judgements compared to participants who are not fatigued. Fatigued participants tend to judge that a moral violation is less permissible even though it would have a beneficial effect, such as killing one person to save the lives of five others. The moral fatigue effect occurs when people make a judgement that focuses on the harmful action, killing one person, but not when they make a judgement that focuses on the beneficial outcome, saving the lives of others, as shown in Experiment 1 ( n = 196). It also occurs for judgements about morally good actions, such as jumping onto railway tracks to save a person who has fallen there, as shown in Experiment 2 ( n = 187). The results have implications for alternative explanations of moral reasoning.
我们报告了两项实验,这些实验显示了一种道德疲劳效应:在完成一项累人的认知任务后感到疲劳的参与者,与未感到疲劳的参与者相比,会做出不同的道德判断。感到疲劳的参与者往往会判断,即使道德违规行为会产生有益的效果,比如杀一人以拯救五人的生命,这种行为也是较不可取的。如实验1(n = 196)所示,当人们做出聚焦于有害行为(杀一人)的判断时,会出现道德疲劳效应,但当他们做出聚焦于有益结果(拯救他人生命)的判断时,则不会出现这种效应。如实验2(n = 187)所示,对于道德上的善举,比如跳到铁轨上救一个掉在那里的人,做出判断时也会出现道德疲劳效应。这些结果对道德推理的其他解释具有启示意义。