Timmons Shane, Byrne Ruth Mj
School of Psychology and Institute of Neuroscience, Trinity College Dublin, University of Dublin, Dublin, Ireland.
Q J Exp Psychol (Hove). 2019 Apr;72(4):943-954. doi: 10.1177/1747021818772045. Epub 2018 May 7.
We report two experiments that show a moral fatigue effect: participants who are fatigued after they have carried out a tiring cognitive task make different moral judgements compared to participants who are not fatigued. Fatigued participants tend to judge that a moral violation is less permissible even though it would have a beneficial effect, such as killing one person to save the lives of five others. The moral fatigue effect occurs when people make a judgement that focuses on the harmful action, killing one person, but not when they make a judgement that focuses on the beneficial outcome, saving the lives of others, as shown in Experiment 1 ( n = 196). It also occurs for judgements about morally good actions, such as jumping onto railway tracks to save a person who has fallen there, as shown in Experiment 2 ( n = 187). The results have implications for alternative explanations of moral reasoning.
我们报告了两项实验，这些实验显示了一种道德疲劳效应：在完成一项累人的认知任务后感到疲劳的参与者，与未感到疲劳的参与者相比，会做出不同的道德判断。感到疲劳的参与者往往会判断，即使道德违规行为会产生有益的效果，比如杀一人以拯救五人的生命，这种行为也是较不可取的。如实验1（n = 196）所示，当人们做出聚焦于有害行为（杀一人）的判断时，会出现道德疲劳效应，但当他们做出聚焦于有益结果（拯救他人生命）的判断时，则不会出现这种效应。如实验2（n = 187）所示，对于道德上的善举，比如跳到铁轨上救一个掉在那里的人，做出判断时也会出现道德疲劳效应。这些结果对道德推理的其他解释具有启示意义。
