Manchester Centre for Health Economics.
School of Health Sciences, University of Manchester, Manchester.
Br J Gen Pract. 2018 Dec;68(677):e811-e818. doi: 10.3399/bjgp18X699797. Epub 2018 Nov 5.
The Quality and Outcomes Framework has generated reputational as well as financial rewards for general practices because the number of quality points a practice receives is publicly reported. These rewards vary across diseases and practices, and over time.
To determine the relative effects on performance of the financial and reputational rewards resulting from a pay-for-performance programme.
Observational study of the published performance on 42 indicators of 8929 practices in England between 2004 and 2013.
The authors calculated the revenue offered (financial reward, measured in £100s) and the points offered (reputational reward) per additional patient treated for each indicator for each practice in each year. Fixed-effects multivariable regression models were used to estimate whether the percentage of eligible patients treated responded to changes in these financial and reputational rewards.
Both the offered financial rewards and reputational rewards had small but statistically significant associations with practice performance. The effect of the financial reward on performance decreased from 0.797 percentage points per £100 (95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.614 to 0.979) in 2004, to 0.092 (95% CI = 0.045 to 0.138) in 2013. The effect of the reputational reward increased from -0.121 percentage points per quality point (95% CI = -0.220 to -0.022) in 2004, to 0.209 (95% CI = 0.147 to 0.271) in 2013.
In the short term, general practices were more sensitive to revenue than reputational rewards. In the long term, general practices appeared to divert their focus towards the reputational reward, once benchmarks of performance became established.
质量和结果框架(Quality and Outcomes Framework)为普通科医生带来了声誉和经济回报,因为医生所获得的质量点数会公开报告。这些奖励因疾病和医生而异,并且随时间而变化。
确定绩效付费计划产生的财务和声誉奖励对绩效的相对影响。
对 2004 年至 2013 年间英格兰 8929 家实践中的 42 项指标的 8929 项实践进行的已发表绩效的观察性研究。
作者计算了每个实践每年每个指标每增加一名治疗患者提供的收入(财务奖励,以 100 英镑为单位)和提供的分数(声誉奖励)。使用固定效应多变量回归模型来估计治疗合格患者的百分比是否对这些财务和声誉奖励的变化做出响应。
财务奖励和声誉奖励都与实践绩效有较小但具有统计学意义的关联。财务奖励对绩效的影响从 2004 年的每 100 英镑 0.797 个百分点(95%置信区间 [CI] = 0.614 至 0.979)下降到 2013 年的 0.092(95% CI = 0.045 至 0.138)。声誉奖励的影响从 2004 年的每质量点-0.121 个百分点(95% CI = -0.220 至 -0.022)增加到 2013 年的 0.209(95% CI = 0.147 至 0.271)。
在短期内,普通科医生对收入比对声誉奖励更敏感。从长期来看,一旦建立了绩效基准,普通科医生似乎就将注意力转移到声誉奖励上。