• 文献检索
  • 文档翻译
  • 深度研究
  • 学术资讯
  • Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件
  • 邀请有礼
  • 套餐&价格
  • 历史记录
应用&插件
Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件浏览器插件Mac 客户端Windows 客户端微信小程序
定价
高级版会员购买积分包购买API积分包
服务
文献检索文档翻译深度研究API 文档MCP 服务
关于我们
关于 Suppr公司介绍联系我们用户协议隐私条款
关注我们

Suppr 超能文献

核心技术专利:CN118964589B侵权必究
粤ICP备2023148730 号-1Suppr @ 2026

文献检索

告别复杂PubMed语法,用中文像聊天一样搜索,搜遍4000万医学文献。AI智能推荐,让科研检索更轻松。

立即免费搜索

文件翻译

保留排版,准确专业,支持PDF/Word/PPT等文件格式,支持 12+语言互译。

免费翻译文档

深度研究

AI帮你快速写综述,25分钟生成高质量综述,智能提取关键信息,辅助科研写作。

立即免费体验

声誉和群体极化导致合作的兴衰。

The rise and fall of cooperation through reputation and group polarization.

机构信息

Department of Psychology, Leiden University, P.O. Box 9555, 2300 RB, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED), University of Amsterdam, P.O. Box 1551, 1001 NB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

出版信息

Nat Commun. 2019 Feb 15;10(1):776. doi: 10.1038/s41467-019-08727-8.

DOI:10.1038/s41467-019-08727-8
PMID:30770812
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6377668/
Abstract

Humans exhibit a remarkable capacity for cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals. Yet, human cooperation is neither universal, nor stable. Instead, cooperation is often bounded to members of particular groups, and such groups endogenously form or break apart. Cooperation networks are parochial and under constant reconfiguration. Here, we demonstrate how parochial cooperation networks endogenously emerge as a consequence of simple reputation heuristics people may use when deciding to cooperate or defect. These reputation heuristics, such as "a friend of a friend is a friend" and "the enemy of a friend is an enemy" further lead to the dynamic formation and fission of cooperative groups, accompanied by a dynamic rise and fall of cooperation among agents. The ability of humans to safeguard kin-independent cooperation through gossip and reputation may be, accordingly, closely interlinked with the formation of group-bounded cooperation networks that are under constant reconfiguration, ultimately preventing global and stable cooperation.

摘要

人类在遗传上无关的个体之间表现出非凡的合作能力。然而,人类的合作既不是普遍的,也不是稳定的。相反,合作往往局限于特定群体的成员,而这些群体则会自发地形成或分裂。合作网络是狭隘的,并在不断重新配置。在这里,我们展示了简单的声誉启发式如何导致狭隘的合作网络作为人们在决定合作或背叛时可能使用的决策结果而自发出现。这些声誉启发式,如“朋友的朋友是朋友”和“朋友的敌人是敌人”,进一步导致合作群体的动态形成和分裂,伴随着代理人之间合作的动态兴衰。人类通过八卦和声誉来维护与亲属无关的合作的能力,因此可能与不断重新配置的群体约束合作网络的形成密切相关,最终阻止全球和稳定的合作。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/ab1a/6377668/7a552a82109c/41467_2019_8727_Fig6_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/ab1a/6377668/d979bb7260ff/41467_2019_8727_Fig1_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/ab1a/6377668/804c6414d1c0/41467_2019_8727_Fig2_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/ab1a/6377668/c86bbd7f4445/41467_2019_8727_Fig3_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/ab1a/6377668/ebd21ccbd524/41467_2019_8727_Fig4_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/ab1a/6377668/14e7da4c8bc0/41467_2019_8727_Fig5_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/ab1a/6377668/7a552a82109c/41467_2019_8727_Fig6_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/ab1a/6377668/d979bb7260ff/41467_2019_8727_Fig1_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/ab1a/6377668/804c6414d1c0/41467_2019_8727_Fig2_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/ab1a/6377668/c86bbd7f4445/41467_2019_8727_Fig3_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/ab1a/6377668/ebd21ccbd524/41467_2019_8727_Fig4_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/ab1a/6377668/14e7da4c8bc0/41467_2019_8727_Fig5_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/ab1a/6377668/7a552a82109c/41467_2019_8727_Fig6_HTML.jpg

相似文献

1
The rise and fall of cooperation through reputation and group polarization.声誉和群体极化导致合作的兴衰。
Nat Commun. 2019 Feb 15;10(1):776. doi: 10.1038/s41467-019-08727-8.
2
Cooperation and social organization depend on weighing private and public reputations.合作和社会组织依赖于权衡私人和公共声誉。
Sci Rep. 2024 Jul 16;14(1):16443. doi: 10.1038/s41598-024-67080-z.
3
Gossip Versus Punishment: The Efficiency of Reputation to Promote and Maintain Cooperation.流言蜚语与惩罚:声誉在促进和维持合作方面的有效性
Sci Rep. 2016 Apr 4;6:23919. doi: 10.1038/srep23919.
4
Sustainable cooperation based on reputation and habituation in the public goods game.公共物品博弈中基于声誉和习惯化的可持续合作。
Biosystems. 2017 Oct;160:33-38. doi: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2017.08.003. Epub 2017 Aug 18.
5
The emergence and selection of reputation systems that drive cooperative behaviour.声誉系统的出现和选择推动了合作行为。
Proc Biol Sci. 2018 Sep 5;285(1886):20181508. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2018.1508.
6
The psychological foundations of reputation-based cooperation.基于声誉的合作的心理学基础。
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2021 Nov 22;376(1838):20200287. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0287. Epub 2021 Oct 4.
7
The value of reputation.声誉的价值。
J R Soc Interface. 2012 Nov 7;9(76):2791-7. doi: 10.1098/rsif.2012.0332. Epub 2012 Jun 20.
8
Group Formation and the Evolution of Human Social Organization.群体形成与人类社会组织的演化。
Perspect Psychol Sci. 2024 Mar;19(2):320-334. doi: 10.1177/17456916231179156. Epub 2023 Jul 14.
9
Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks.基于声誉的伙伴选择促进社交网络中的合作。
Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys. 2008 Aug;78(2 Pt 2):026117. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.78.026117. Epub 2008 Aug 22.
10
Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation.对进化动力学的全球分析以及对通过声誉维持合作的社会规范进行详尽搜索。
J Theor Biol. 2007 Feb 7;244(3):518-31. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.08.018. Epub 2006 Sep 1.

引用本文的文献

1
Cooperation and social organization depend on weighing private and public reputations.合作和社会组织依赖于权衡私人和公共声誉。
Sci Rep. 2024 Jul 16;14(1):16443. doi: 10.1038/s41598-024-67080-z.
2
Indirect reciprocity undermines indirect reciprocity destabilizing large-scale cooperation.间接互惠破坏间接互惠,破坏大规模合作的稳定性。
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2024 May 7;121(19):e2322072121. doi: 10.1073/pnas.2322072121. Epub 2024 Apr 29.
3
Super-additive cooperation.超加性合作。

本文引用的文献

1
Social norm complexity and past reputations in the evolution of cooperation.社会规范复杂性和过去声誉在合作进化中的作用。
Nature. 2018 Mar 7;555(7695):242-245. doi: 10.1038/nature25763.
2
Exceptional Evolutionary Expansion of Prefrontal Cortex in Great Apes and Humans.巨猿和人类前额皮质的非凡进化扩张。
Curr Biol. 2017 Mar 6;27(5):714-720. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2017.01.020. Epub 2017 Feb 2.
3
Reputation Effects in Social Networks Do Not Promote Cooperation: An Experimental Test of the Raub & Weesie Model.社交网络中的声誉效应不会促进合作:劳布与韦西模型的实验检验
Nature. 2024 Feb;626(8001):1034-1041. doi: 10.1038/s41586-024-07077-w. Epub 2024 Feb 21.
4
Partner choice and cooperation in social dilemmas can increase resource inequality.在社会困境中,合作对象的选择和合作行为可能会加剧资源不平等。
Nat Commun. 2023 Oct 13;14(1):6432. doi: 10.1038/s41467-023-42128-2.
5
Indirect reciprocity with stochastic and dual reputation updates.带有随机和双重声誉更新的间接互惠。
PLoS Comput Biol. 2023 Jul 20;19(7):e1011271. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011271. eCollection 2023 Jul.
6
Group Formation and the Evolution of Human Social Organization.群体形成与人类社会组织的演化。
Perspect Psychol Sci. 2024 Mar;19(2):320-334. doi: 10.1177/17456916231179156. Epub 2023 Jul 14.
7
Grouping promotes both partnership and rivalry with long memory in direct reciprocity.分组促进了直接互惠中的伙伴关系和竞争,同时具有长记忆。
PLoS Comput Biol. 2023 Jun 20;19(6):e1011228. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011228. eCollection 2023 Jun.
8
Beyond collective intelligence: Collective adaptation.超越集体智慧:集体适应。
J R Soc Interface. 2023 Mar;20(200):20220736. doi: 10.1098/rsif.2022.0736. Epub 2023 Mar 22.
9
The evolution of universal cooperation.普遍合作的进化。
Sci Adv. 2023 Feb 17;9(7):eadd8289. doi: 10.1126/sciadv.add8289.
10
Studying topic engagement and synergy among candidates for 2020 US Elections.研究2020年美国大选候选人之间的话题参与度与协同效应。
Soc Netw Anal Min. 2022;12(1):136. doi: 10.1007/s13278-022-00959-9. Epub 2022 Sep 11.
PLoS One. 2016 Jul 1;11(7):e0155703. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0155703. eCollection 2016.
4
Cooperation Survives and Cheating Pays in a Dynamic Network Structure with Unreliable Reputation.在声誉不可靠的动态网络结构中,合作得以存续,作弊也有回报。
Sci Rep. 2016 Jun 2;6:27160. doi: 10.1038/srep27160.
5
Reputation, a universal currency for human social interactions.声誉,人类社会交往中的一种通用货币。
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2016 Feb 5;371(1687):20150100. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2015.0100.
6
Social network size in humans.人类的社交网络规模。
Hum Nat. 2003 Mar;14(1):53-72. doi: 10.1007/s12110-003-1016-y.
7
The rise of partisanship and super-cooperators in the U.S. House of Representatives.美国众议院中党派性和超级合作者的崛起。
PLoS One. 2015 Apr 21;10(4):e0123507. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0123507. eCollection 2015.
8
The effects of reputational and social knowledge on cooperation.声誉和社会知识对合作的影响。
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2015 Mar 24;112(12):3647-52. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1415883112. Epub 2015 Mar 9.
9
Reputation drives cooperative behaviour and network formation in human groups.声誉推动人类群体中的合作行为和网络形成。
Sci Rep. 2015 Jan 19;5:7843. doi: 10.1038/srep07843.
10
Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review.进化博弈中的循环优势:综述
J R Soc Interface. 2014 Nov 6;11(100):20140735. doi: 10.1098/rsif.2014.0735.