Department of Microbiology and Immunology, The University of Melbourne at The Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity, Melbourne, Australia.
Department of Methods Development and Analytics, Division of Infectious Disease Control and Environmental Health, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway.
Euro Surveill. 2021 Nov;26(44). doi: 10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2021.26.44.2001996.
BackgroundMany countries have attempted to mitigate and control COVID-19 through non-pharmaceutical interventions, particularly with the aim of reducing population movement and contact. However, it remains unclear how the different control strategies impacted the local phylodynamics of the causative SARS-CoV-2 virus.AimWe aimed to assess the duration of chains of virus transmission within individual countries and the extent to which countries exported viruses to their geographical neighbours.MethodsWe analysed complete SARS-CoV-2 genomes to infer the relative frequencies of virus importation and exportation, as well as virus transmission dynamics, in countries of northern Europe. We examined virus evolution and phylodynamics in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic.ResultsThe Nordic countries differed markedly in the invasiveness of control strategies, which we found reflected in transmission chain dynamics. For example, Sweden, which compared with the other Nordic countries relied more on recommendation-based rather than legislation-based mitigation interventions, had transmission chains that were more numerous and tended to have more cases. This trend increased over the first 8 months of 2020. Together with Denmark, Sweden was a net exporter of SARS-CoV-2. Norway and Finland implemented legislation-based interventions; their transmission chain dynamics were in stark contrast to their neighbouring country Sweden.ConclusionSweden constituted an epidemiological and evolutionary refugium that enabled the virus to maintain active transmission and spread to other geographical locations. Our analysis reveals the utility of genomic surveillance where monitoring of active transmission chains is a key metric.
许多国家试图通过非药物干预措施来减轻和控制 COVID-19,特别是旨在减少人口流动和接触。然而,不同的控制策略如何影响致病 SARS-CoV-2 病毒的本地系统发生学仍不清楚。
我们旨在评估个别国家内病毒传播链的持续时间,以及各国向其地理邻国输出病毒的程度。
我们分析了完整的 SARS-CoV-2 基因组,以推断北欧国家病毒输入和输出的相对频率,以及病毒传播动态。我们研究了丹麦、芬兰、冰岛、挪威和瑞典在 COVID-19 大流行的第一年的病毒进化和系统发生学。
北欧国家的控制策略的侵入性明显不同,我们发现这反映在传播链动态中。例如,瑞典与其他北欧国家相比,更多地依赖基于建议而不是基于立法的缓解干预措施,其传播链数量更多,且往往有更多的病例。这种趋势在 2020 年的前 8 个月中不断增加。瑞典与丹麦一起是 SARS-CoV-2 的净出口国。挪威和芬兰实施了基于立法的干预措施;与邻国瑞典相比,它们的传播链动态形成鲜明对比。
瑞典构成了一个流行病学和进化避难所,使病毒能够保持活跃的传播并传播到其他地理位置。我们的分析揭示了基因组监测的实用性,其中对活跃传播链的监测是一个关键指标。