Elgabry Mariam, Johnson Shane
DAWES Center for Future Crime at UCL, Jill Dando Institute for Security and Crime Science, London, United Kingdom.
Bronic, London, United Kingdom.
Front Bioeng Biotechnol. 2024 Sep 24;12:1456354. doi: 10.3389/fbioe.2024.1456354. eCollection 2024.
The introduction of the capability to "program" a biological system is referred to as Engineered biology and can be compared to the introduction of the internet and the capability of programming a computer. Engineered biology is supported by a digital infrastructure that includes data, data storage, computer-dependent laboratory equipment, internet-connected communication networks, and supply chains. This connectivity is important. It can improve workflows and enhance productivity. At the same time and unlike computer programs, biological systems introduce unique threats as they can self-assemble, self-repair, and self-replicate. The aim of this paper is to systematically review the cyber implications of engineered biology. This includes cyber-bio opportunities and threats as engineered biology continues to integrate into cyberspace. We used a systematic search methodology to review the academic literature, and supplemented this with a review of opensource materials and "grey" literature that is not disseminated by academic publishers. A comprehensive search of articles published in or after 2017 until the 21st of October 2022 found 52 studies that focus on implications of engineered biology to cyberspace. The search was conducted using search engines that index over 60 databases-databases that specifically cover the information security, and biology literatures, as well as the wider set of academic disciplines. Across these 52 articles, we identified a total of 7 cyber opportunities including automated bio-foundries and 4 cyber threats such as Artificial Intelligence misuse and biological dataset targeting. We highlight the 4 main types of cyberbiosecurity solutions identified in the literature and we suggest a total of 9 policy recommendations that can be utilized by various entities, including governments, to ensure that cyberbiosecurity remains frontline in a growing bioeconomy.
将对生物系统进行“编程”的能力引入被称为合成生物学,这可以与互联网的引入以及对计算机进行编程的能力相比较。合成生物学由一个数字基础设施支持,该基础设施包括数据、数据存储、依赖计算机的实验室设备、联网通信网络和供应链。这种连接性很重要。它可以改善工作流程并提高生产力。与此同时,与计算机程序不同,生物系统带来了独特的威胁,因为它们可以自我组装、自我修复和自我复制。本文的目的是系统地回顾合成生物学的网络影响。这包括随着合成生物学不断融入网络空间而产生的网络 - 生物机遇和威胁。我们使用系统搜索方法来回顾学术文献,并辅以对开源材料和非学术出版商传播的“灰色”文献的回顾。对2017年及以后至2022年10月21日发表的文章进行全面搜索,发现有52项研究关注合成生物学对网络空间的影响。搜索使用了索引60多个数据库的搜索引擎——这些数据库专门涵盖信息安全、生物学文献以及更广泛的学术学科。在这52篇文章中,我们总共确定了7个网络机遇,包括自动化生物铸造厂,以及4个网络威胁,如人工智能滥用和针对生物数据集。我们强调了文献中确定的4种主要的网络生物安全解决方案类型,并提出了总共9项政策建议,可供包括政府在内的各种实体利用,以确保在不断发展的生物经济中网络生物安全始终处于前沿。