Rozenblit Leonid, Keil Frank
Department of Psychology, Yale University, 2 Hillhouse Avenue, P.O. Box 208205, New Haven, CT 06520-8205, USA.
Cogn Sci. 2002 Sep 1;26(5):521-562. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog2605_1.
People feel they understand complex phenomena with far greater precision, coherence, and depth than they really do; they are subject to an illusion-an illusion of explanatory depth. The illusion is far stronger for explanatory knowledge than many other kinds of knowledge, such as that for facts, procedures or narratives. The illusion for explanatory knowledge is most robust where the environment supports real-time explanations with visible mechanisms. We demonstrate the illusion of depth with explanatory knowledge in Studies 1-6. Then we show differences in overconfidence about knowledge across different knowledge domains in Studies 7-10. Finally, we explore the mechanisms behind the initial confidence and behind overconfidence in Studies 11 and 12. Implications for the roles of intuitive theories in models of concepts and cognition are discussed.
人们觉得自己对复杂现象的理解远比实际情况更加精确、连贯和深刻；他们容易受到一种错觉——解释性深度错觉的影响。这种错觉在解释性知识方面比许多其他类型的知识（如事实、程序或叙述性知识）要强烈得多。在环境支持通过可见机制进行实时解释的情况下，解释性知识的错觉最为强烈。我们在研究1 - 6中通过解释性知识证明了深度错觉。然后在研究7 - 10中展示了不同知识领域在知识过度自信方面的差异。最后，在研究11和12中我们探究了最初的自信以及过度自信背后的机制。还讨论了直观理论在概念和认知模型中的作用。
