Glöckner Andreas, Fiedler Susann, Hochman Guy, Ayal Shahar, Hilbig Benjamin E
Research Group Intuitive Experts, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn, Germany.
Front Psychol. 2012 Jun 13;3:173. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00173. eCollection 2012.
Do decisions from description and from experience trigger different cognitive processes? We investigated this general question using cognitive modeling, eye-tracking, and physiological arousal measures. Three novel findings indeed suggest qualitatively different processes between the two types of decisions. First, comparative modeling indicates that evidence-accumulation models assuming averaging of all fixation-sampled outcomes predict choices best in decisions from experience, whereas Cumulative Prospect Theory predicts choices best in decisions from descriptions. Second, arousal decreased with increasing difference in expected value between gambles in description-based choices but not in experience. Third, the relation between attention and subjective weights given to outcomes was stronger for experience-based than for description-based tasks. Overall, our results indicate that processes in experience-based risky choice can be captured by sampling-and-averaging evidence-accumulation model. This model cannot be generalized to description-based decisions, in which more complex mechanisms are involved.
基于描述和基于经验的决策会引发不同的认知过程吗?我们使用认知建模、眼动追踪和生理唤醒测量方法对这个一般性问题进行了研究。三项新发现确实表明这两种决策类型在本质上存在不同的过程。首先,比较建模表明,假设对所有注视采样结果进行平均的证据积累模型在基于经验的决策中能最好地预测选择,而累积前景理论在基于描述的决策中能最好地预测选择。其次,在基于描述的选择中,随着赌博预期价值差异的增加,唤醒水平会降低,但在基于经验的选择中并非如此。第三,与基于描述的任务相比,基于经验的任务中注意力与赋予结果的主观权重之间的关系更强。总体而言,我们的结果表明,基于经验的风险选择过程可以通过采样平均证据积累模型来捕捉。该模型不能推广到基于描述的决策,因为后者涉及更复杂的机制。