Leget Carlo
Ethics of Care, University of Humanistic Studies, PO Box 797, 3500 AT, Utrecht, The Netherlands,
Med Health Care Philos. 2013 Nov;16(4):945-52. doi: 10.1007/s11019-012-9427-3.
The concept of dignity is notoriously vague. In this paper it is argued that the reason for this is that there are three versions of dignity that are often confused. First we will take a short look at the history of the concept of dignity in order to demonstrate how already from Roman Antiquity two versions of dignity can be distinguished. Subsequently, the third version will be introduced and it will be argued that although the three versions of dignity hang together, they should also be clearly distinguished in order to avoid confusion. The reason for distinguishing the three versions is because all three of them are only partially effective. This will be demonstrated by taking the discussion about voluntary 'dying with dignity' as an example. Inspired by both Paul Ricoeur's concept of ethics and the ethics of care a proposition will be done as to how the three versions of dignity may sustain each other and help achieve what neither one of the versions can do on its own.
尊严的概念极为模糊。本文认为，其原因在于存在三种常被混淆的尊严版本。首先，我们将简要回顾尊严概念的历史，以展示从罗马古代起就可区分出两种尊严版本。随后，将引入第三种版本，并论证尽管这三种尊严版本相互关联，但为避免混淆，也应明确区分。区分这三种版本的原因是它们都只是部分有效。这将以关于自愿“尊严死”的讨论为例进行说明。受保罗·利科的伦理概念和关怀伦理的启发，将提出一个关于三种尊严版本如何相互支持并有助于实现任何一种版本单独无法达成之事的命题。
