Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, 603 E. Daniel Street, Champaign, IL 61820, USA.
Psychon Bull Rev. 2013 Jun;20(3):601-7. doi: 10.3758/s13423-013-0379-2.
Those who are less skilled tend to overestimate their abilities more than do those who are more skilled-the so-called Dunning-Kruger effect. Less-skilled performers presumably have less of the knowledge needed to make informed guesses about their relative performance. If so, the Dunning-Kruger effect should vanish when participants do have access to information about their relative ability and performance. Competitive bridge players predicted their results for bridge sessions before playing and received feedback about their actual performance following each session. Despite knowing their own relative skill and showing unbiased memory for their performance, they made overconfident predictions consistent with a Dunning-Kruger effect. This bias persisted even though players received accurate feedback about their predictions after each session. The finding of a Dunning-Kruger effect despite knowledge of relative ability suggests that differential self-knowledge is not a necessary precondition for the Dunning-Kruger effect. At least in some cases, the effect might reflect a different form of irrational optimism.
那些技能较差的人往往比技能较高的人更容易高估自己的能力——这就是所谓的邓宁-克鲁格效应。技能较差的人大概缺乏做出关于自己相对表现的明智猜测所需的知识。如果是这样,那么当参与者确实可以获得关于自己相对能力和表现的信息时,邓宁-克鲁格效应应该会消失。竞争桥牌手在打牌前预测自己的成绩,并在每一轮比赛后收到关于自己实际表现的反馈。尽管他们知道自己的相对技能,并且对自己的表现表现出无偏见的记忆,但他们的预测过于自信,与邓宁-克鲁格效应一致。即使在每一轮比赛后,玩家都收到了关于他们预测的准确反馈,这种偏差仍然存在。尽管知道自己的相对能力,但仍存在邓宁-克鲁格效应,这表明不同的自我认知并不是邓宁-克鲁格效应的必要前提。至少在某些情况下,这种效应可能反映了一种不同形式的非理性乐观主义。