Liu Wenxia, Jiang Jiang, Mao Zhixin, Liu Honglei
School of Business, Changshu Institute of Technology, Changshu, Jiangsu, China.
School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai, China.
PLoS One. 2025 Feb 11;20(2):e0314511. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0314511. eCollection 2025.
To address increasingly severe environmental issues, various countries have introduced relevant environmental protection regulations. This paper proposes a new government regulation measure to encourage manufacturers to improve recycling rates. Governments set recycling rate targets and reward-penalty mechanisms. This paper constructs a game model involving a manufacturer and a remanufacturer within a closed-loop supply chain system. It studies the equilibrium decisions in three scenarios: no government intervention, manufacturers not taking improvement measures despite government-set recycling rate targets, and manufacturers adopting ecological design after such targets are established. Results indicate that after governments establish recycling rate target: (1) After manufacturers adopt ecological design, the prices of new and remanufactured products decrease, sales volume increases, and the profits of both manufacturers and remanufacturers rise. Therefore, manufacturers would be well-advised to adopt eco-design strategies to enhance the level of recycling. (2) As the recycling rate target increase, the level of ecological design decreases, and the prices of new and remanufactured products rise. It is recommended that governments initially set lower recycling rate targets and then gradually increase them. (3) With the increase in the reward-penalty coefficient, the level of ecological design rises, and the price of new products first increases and then decreases. When remanufacturing is unrestricted, the prices of remanufactured products decrease; however, when remanufacturing is restricted, the prices of remanufactured products first increase and then decrease. Therefore, governments would be well-advised to establish a relatively high reward-penalty coefficient.
为应对日益严峻的环境问题，各国纷纷出台相关环境保护法规。本文提出一种新的政府监管措施，以鼓励制造商提高回收率。政府设定回收率目标并建立奖惩机制。本文构建了一个闭环供应链系统中制造商和再制造商之间的博弈模型。研究了三种情况下的均衡决策：无政府干预、制造商在政府设定回收率目标后不采取改进措施、制造商在设定目标后采用生态设计。结果表明，政府设定回收率目标后：（1）制造商采用生态设计后，新产品和再制造产品价格下降，销量增加，制造商和再制造商的利润均上升。因此，制造商宜采用生态设计策略以提高回收水平。（2）随着回收率目标提高，生态设计水平下降，新产品和再制造产品价格上升。建议政府最初设定较低的回收率目标，然后逐步提高。（3）随着奖惩系数增加，生态设计水平上升，新产品价格先上升后下降。当再制造不受限制时，再制造产品价格下降；然而，当再制造受到限制时，再制造产品价格先上升后下降。因此，政府宜建立相对较高的奖惩系数。
