Gangl Katharina, Hofmann Eva, Kirchler Erich
University of Vienna, Faculty of Psychology, Austria.
New Ideas Psychol. 2015 Feb;37:13-23. doi: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2014.12.001.
Tax compliance represents a social dilemma in which the short-term self-interest to minimize tax payments is at odds with the collective long-term interest to provide sufficient tax funds for public goods. According to the Slippery Slope Framework, the social dilemma can be solved and tax compliance can be guaranteed by power of tax authorities and trust in tax authorities. The framework, however, remains silent on the dynamics between power and trust. The aim of the present theoretical paper is to conceptualize the dynamics between power and trust by differentiating coercive and legitimate power and reason-based and implicit trust. Insights into this dynamic are derived from an integration of a wide range of literature such as on organizational behavior and social influence. Conclusions on the effect of the dynamics between power and trust on the interaction climate between authorities and individuals and subsequent individual motivation of cooperation in social dilemmas such as tax contributions are drawn. Practically, the assumptions on the dynamics can be utilized by authorities to increase cooperation and to change the interaction climate from an antagonistic climate to a service and confidence climate.
税收遵从构成了一种社会困境，即尽量减少纳税的短期自身利益与为公共物品提供充足税收资金的集体长期利益相冲突。根据滑坡框架，社会困境可以通过税务机关的权力和对税务机关的信任来解决并确保税收遵从。然而，该框架对权力与信任之间的动态关系未作阐述。本理论论文的目的是通过区分强制权力和合法权力以及基于理性的信任和隐性信任来概念化权力与信任之间的动态关系。对这种动态关系的见解源自对广泛文献（如关于组织行为和社会影响的文献）的整合。得出了关于权力与信任之间的动态关系对当局与个人之间的互动氛围以及随后在诸如纳税等社会困境中个人合作动机的影响的结论。实际上，当局可以利用关于这种动态关系的假设来促进合作，并将互动氛围从对抗性氛围转变为服务和信任氛围。
